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Judges and academic commentators debate, often with great
vigor, what role to accord the federal judiciary-vis-a-vis state courts,
Congress, and the executive. Central to the debate is some shared no-
tion about the special qualities of federal courts. However much au-
thority one might want federal courts to have, we have come to accept
that federal judges possess enormous power, often attributed to their
constitutionally-accorded qualities of life tenure and no diminution of
salary. These extraordinary luxuries give federal judges unusual se-
curity. Exempt from the woes that beset other members of federal and
state government, 1 federal judges are empowered and in some sense
ennobled by their constitutional status. Federal courts and their
judges, as created by Article III, are special.
The constitutional grant of federal adjudicatory power to Article
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III judges appears straightforward. However, the federal courts are
not populated only by the remarkable Article III actors described in
the constitutional text. There are many other individuals, whose num-
bers far outstrip those of the federal judges, who have the power to
perform adjudicatory functions within the federal system but who pos-
sess neither life tenure nor salary guarantees. These individuals bear
different titles, such as "administrative law judge," "hearing officer,"
"magistrate," and "bankruptcy judge." Some work in institutions la-
beled agencies, while others reside in so-called legislative or "Article
I" courts, and still others find their niches within Article III courts
themselves. It is quite clear that what these officials do is judge-like.
They make factual findings about disputed matters and issue opinions
in which legal rules are applied. Moreover, the decisions of these offi-
cials constitute a large proportion of the federal adjudicative process.
While the Article III civil docket in 1984 had some 250,000 pending
cases and 243,000 case dispositions were made,2 the Social Security
Administration alone made 337,459 dispositions.3 In 1984, there were
515 Article III trial judges4 and 1121 administrative law judges.5 In
2. 1984 REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.s. COURTS 124
[hereinafter 1984 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT].
3. SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION (SSA) OPERATIONAL REPORT OF THE OFFICE OF HEAR-
INGS AND ApPEALS 26 (Sept. 1984). While recent statistical compilations of all federal agencies' work
are unavailable, a study conducted in 1983 by the Administrative Conference of the United States
estimated that some 391,000 new cases were filed with administrative law judges during that year. The
SSA accounted for the bulk (363,000) of the filings. The National Labor Relations Board reported
4,900 filings, while the Environmental Protection Agency reported only 340. Lubbers, Federal Agency
Adjudication: Trying to See the Trees and the Forest, 31 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 383, 384 (1984).
There are numerous other federal agencies with adjudicative functions including: Civil Aeronau-
tics Board, 49 U.S.C. § 1321 (1982); Commodity Futures Trading Commission, 7 U.S.c. § 4a (1982);
Consumer Product Safety Commission, 15 U.S.C. § 2053 (1982); Federal Aviation Administration, 49
U.S.C. § 1485 (1982); Federal Communications Commission, 47 U.S.C. § 503 (1982); Federal Maritime
Commission, 46 U.S.C. § 822 (1982); Federal Power Commission, 16 U.S.C. § 797 (1982); Federal
Savings and Loan Insurance Corp., 12 U.S.C. § 1730(a) (1982); Federal Trade Commission, 15 U.S.C.
§§ 45, 57(a) (1982); Food and Drug Administration, 21 U.S.c. § 371(e) (1982); Interstate Commerce
Commission, 49 U.S.C.A. § 11701 (West Supp. 1985); Immigration and Naturalization Service, 8
U.S.C. § 1551 (1982); Occupational Health and Safety Commission, 29 U.S.C. § 661 (1982); Securities
and Exchange Commission, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(i), 77(vvv), 78(u)-79(y), 79(x) (1982); and the Social Secur-
ity Administration, 42 U.S.C. § 1383, amended by Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984). Mine
Safety is regulated, in part, by the Secretary of the Interior, 30 U.S.c. § 814 (1982); and the Secretary of
Labor resolves some labor disputes under 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1982). In 'addition to agencies, there are
other auxiliary adjudicatory institutions. E.g., National Railroad Adjustment Board, 45 U.S.C. §§ 153,
797(m) (1982) (described and held constitutional in United Transp. Union v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
593 F. Supp. 1346 (Regional Rail Rearg. Ct. 1984); Benefits Review Board, 33 U.S.C. § 921(c) (1982)
(reviewing workers' compensation claims oflongshoremen and harbor workers); and the Federal Metal
and Nonmetallic Mine Safety Board of Review, 30 U.S.C. § 731 (1982).
4. 1984 ADMINISTRATIVE OFACE REPORT, supra note 2, at 129.
5. This is the number of administrative law judges employed in that year. Lubbers, supra note 3,
at 383. Not all federal agency hearing examiners are administrative law judges; e.g., the hearing exam-
iners of the United Stales Parole Commission, 18 U.S.C. § 4203 (1982) (repealed by the Sentencing
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short, there are a large number of non-Article III federal adjudicatory
personnel who decide a vast number of federal cases.6 Moreover, their
ranks have recently swelled with the enactment of the 1984 amend-
ments to the Bankruptcy Act7 and the creation of a new Claims
Court. 8
Perhaps most striking of all is that the United States Supreme
Court (an institution one might assume to be the quintessential guard-
ian of Article III-ness) has, in a line of cases dating back almost to the
inception of the country,9 endorsed congressional authority to imbue
non-Article III decisionmakers with adjudicatory capacities. More-
over, despite a substantial body of case law devoted to the exegesis of
Article III, firm statements about the limits of congressional authority
are difficult to make. How are we to reconcile the portentous consti-
tutional provisions empowering federal judges with the growth of an
enormous auxiliary of federal judicial personnel? Should we be con-
cerned that federal judicial power is being diminished by the number
of federal decisionmakers who lack life tenure and are vulnerable to
pressures from their employers?1O Should we be comforted by the ad-
Reform.Act of 1984, ch. 2, §§ 218(a)(5), 235, 98 Stat. 2027, 2031) (repeal not effective until November
I, 1986). See generally Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) (in light of growth of agencies' role, tripartite schema
no longer appropriate; agencies are a "fourth branch" and checks and balances must be worked out
accordingly); Palmer, The Evolving Role of Administrative Law Judges, 19 NEW ENG. L. REV. 755
(1983-84).
6. I use the term "non-Article III" actors to encompass a diverse set of institutions and personnel,
including so-called "Article I" or "legislative" courts, such as military courts that are virtually in-
dependent of Article III courts, administrative agency adjudication in which orders are typically en-
forceable and therefore reviewable by Article III courts, magistrates who work as assistants to Article
III judges, and a variety of other groups, such as bankruptcy judges, arbitration boards and the like, all
creatures of federal statutes, all not given life tenure, all functioning as adjudicators and all somewhat
(and to varying degrees) connected to the Article III adjudication process.
7. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333
(codified in several sections of 28 U.S.C.). In 1984, there were 304,014 bankruptcy dispositions. 1984
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 2, at II.
8. The Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (1982), codified at 28
U.S.C. § I note (1982). See Baker, Is the United States Claims Court Constitutional? 32 CLEV. ST. L.
REV. 55, 99 (1983-84) (arguing that the Claims Court, whose judges are appointed for fifteen-year
terms and whose salaries are congressionally controlled, but whose work is "national in scope and
importance," is unconstitutional).
9. E.g., American Ins. Co. v. Canter, I Pet. 511 (1828), discussed infra notes 28-41 and accompa-
nying text. In addition to upholding congressional authority to create adjudicatory institutions staffed
by judges without life tenure, the Supreme Court has been flexible in its enforcement of the non-diminu-
tion of compensation clause of Article III. See United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200 (1980) (congres-
sionally-authorized salary increases in effect may not be repealed but those not yet effective may be
repealed); Atkins v. United States, 556 F.2d 1028 (Ct. Ct., 197~, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1978)
(rejection of suit by 140 district and circuit court judges who attacked congressional and executive
failure to adjust judicial salaries to compensate for inflation).
10. E.g., Association of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984)
(administrative law judges who had high rates of decisions approving disability benefit requests sub-
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dition of needed personnel and by the flexibility afforded when the
employment commitment is less than life tenure?!! Should we care
whether Congress or the executive creates, or the Court condones, the
use of non-Article III personnel? These are the questions which this
article addresses.
II. A HYPOTHETICAL "COMMERCE COURT"
Exploration of the meaning of Article III often occurs in the con-
text of whether and how that section constrains congressional behav-
ior. The question typically arises when Congress creates an
adjudicatory apparatus populated by decisionmakers lacking Article
III protections of life tenure and salary guarantees. To ground this
consideration of the meaning of Article III, I provide the following,
hypothetical congressional proposal-for a new "Commerce Court."!2
Assume that Congress, acting pursuant to its powers to "regulate
Commerce ... among the several States,,13 and to "constitute Tribu-
jected to greater review than administrative law judges who denied such requests). See generally Heflin,
A Question ofIndependence, 19 W. ENG. L. REV. 693 (1983-84) (advocating a new Administrative Law
Judge Corps Act to increase the independence of administrative law judges by separating those judges
from the agencies to which they are currently assigned). A version of such a bill, S. 673, 99th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Mar. 14, 1985) is now pending. See also R. CASS, AGENCY REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW JUDGES' DECISIONS (1983) (report to the Administrative Conference of the United States;
changes in internal agency review procedures recommended).
II. CompulSory retirement of federal judges has been proposed (see H. CHASE, FEDERAL
JUDGES: THE ApPOINTING PROCESS 194 (1972» and the recent Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-458,94 Stat. 2035, codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 331,
332,372,604 (1982), is a muted effort to respond to some of the concerns about employing individuals
for life. For discussion of that Act's possible unconstitutionality, see Note, Unnecessary and Improper:
The Judicial Councils Reform and Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980,94 YALE LJ. 1117
(1985).
12. My hypothetical "Commerce Court" should be distinguished from the real Commerce Court,
created in 1910 and possessing jurisdiction over "all cases for the enforcement. . . of any order of the
Interstate Commerce Commission." See Pub. L. No. 36-218, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (1910). The juris-
diction of that court was narrowly construed in Procter & Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U.S. 282
(1912), and was abolished in 1913. See Urgent Deficiences Act of Oct. 22,1913, Pub. L. No. 38-32, 38
Stat. 208, 219 (1913). The Commerce Court's limited jurisdiction, coupled with the fact that it sat in
Washington, left the court vulnerable to impressions that "the railroads could exert greater influence on
the Court ... than isolated shippers." 1 J. MOORE, J. LUCAS, H. FINK, D. WECKSTEIN, AND J.
WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE para. 0.3 [6] (2d ed. 1985). See generally Robbins, The Com-
merce Court Scandal, 74 CENT. L.J. 356 (1912) (discussing impeachment proceedings against a Com-
merce Court judge); Baker, The Commerce Court-Its Origin, Its Powers and Its Judges, 20 YALE L.J.
555, 562 (1911) (the creation of the court "portends good results and ... equality and expedition
..."); Dix, The Death of the Commerce Court: A Study in Institutional Weakness, 8 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 238 (1964) (Commerce Court's failure to attract support from influential interests and to achieve
a genera! aura of legitimacy led to the court's demise); F. FRANKFURTER AND J. LANDIS, THE BUSI-
NESS OF THE SUPREME CoURT 162-175 (1927) (Commerce Court had too many politically sensitive
issues to determine; "probably no court has ever been called upon to adjudicate so large a volume of
litigation of as far-reaching import in so brief a time." Id. at 164).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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nals inferior to the supreme Court,"14 declares that
all cases arising under federal law and related to interstate com-
merce shall be heard exclusively by the Commerce Court, to be
staffed by judges appointed by the President for terms of twelve
years and with a salary set yearly by the Judiciary Committee of
the House of Representatives but not to be less than $60,000
yearly.
Does Congress have the power to create such an institution? One
easy (and therefore attractive) answer is "decidedly not." Article III
of the United States Constitution uses mandatory language: it states
that the "judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from
time to time ordain and establish."15 The Constitution requires that
Article III judges "hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall,
. . . receive. . a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during
their Continuance in Office.,,16 Since the proposed statute purports to
establish "courts" populated by judges who are npt cloaked with such
attributes, the statute plainly does not create a new set of Article III
judges. Moreover, the statute gives those judges the task of deciding
cases that fall squarely within the enumerated categories provided by
the Constitution for Article III judges to decide. 17 Therefore, the hy-
pothetical Commerce Court, which attempts to entrust the work of
Article III courts to non-Article III judges, appears to be beyond the
powers of Congress, and the legislation fails.
Would that the world were so simple. Such a straightforward
(albeit still interpretoryl8) reading of the Constitution offers the advan-
tages of a "bright line" and easy consistency: Congress can make no
"courts" whose judges are not garbed with Article III protections, es-
pecially if such "courts" are to decide cases "arising under the Consti-
tution" or "laws of the United States." There are, however, two
problems with this interpretation. First, since the Judiciary Act of
1789,19 it has been evident that not all of the categories of judicial
power enumerated in Article III, section 2 must be decided by Article
III judges. Rather, the judiciary Act apparently assumed-and the
practice soon emerged-that state courts could decide cases that fall
14. Id.
15. U.s. CONST., art. Ill, § I.
16. Id.
17. Specifically, Article Ill, § 2 provides that "[t]he judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in
Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States ......
18. See Tushnet, A Note on the Revival 0/ Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 So. CAL. L.
REV. 683 (1985); see generally Symposium on Interpretation. 58 So. CAL. L. REV. I (1985).
19. I Stat. 73.
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within the grant of federal judicial power. Judges in state courts lack
the Article III protections of life tenure and no diminution of salary.
Given state court decisionmaking in this area, the proposition that Ar-
ticle III courts alone can decide Article III business is unfounded.
But perhaps the work of state courts on Article III matters does
not so readily validate the hypothetical "Commerce Court" as might
first appear. State courts are creatures of other governments; their
judges are appointed by mechanisms removed from the reach of Con-
gress. One of the most frequently presented justifications for Article
III safeguards is that the Constitution wisely protected the federal ju- .
diciary from supervision by the legislative and executive branches.20
The independence obtained from life tenure and salary protections is
supposed to enable federal judges to evaluate actions of the executive
and legislature impartially and to be willing to do battle with them.
State courts are, at least on paper, independent from Congress; thus
their work on Article III matters does not undermine the constitu-
tional purposes as evidenced by Article III. However, congressional
creation of "courts" like the "Commerce Court" raises all the con-
cerns about independence. After all, if the proposed "Commerce
Court" judges were to issue decisions Congress disliked, Congress
could repeal the enabling statute, abolish the courts and remove the
judges from office. As long as Article III of the Constitution stands for
the proposition that a federal judiciary independent from the Congress
is required, then Congress is prohibited from establishing courts popu-
lated by judges without Article III status.
This line of reasoning is, however, defeated by an ultimately in-
surmountable response-reality. Congress has created institutions
bearing the label "courts" and the Supreme Court has sanctioned
those entities as constitutional. The line of cases is long and the prop-
osition-contrary to a simple reading of Article III-is firmly estab-
lished.21 According to the Supreme Court, the Constitution permits
Congress to create adjudicatory institutions other than Article III
courts. Some of these institutions are called "legislative" or "Article
I" courts. Others are denominated "administrative agencies," and
20. Kaufman, Chilling Judicial Independence, 88 YALE L.J. 681, 682 (1979) (Judge Kaufman
also argued that judges are protected from supervision by each other. Id. at 708). See also Feinberg,
Constraining "The Least Dangerous Branch ':. The Tradition ofAttacks on Judicial Power, 59 N.Y. U. L.
REv. 252 (1984); Tushnet, Invitation to a Wedding' Some Thoughts on Article III and a Problem of
Statutory Interpretation, 60 IOWA L. REv. 937 (1975).
21. American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 1 Pet. 511 (1828), discussed infra notes 28-41 and accompanying
text; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1931), discussed infra notes 51-69 and accompanying text;
United States ex. rel Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
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some are in between.22 Further, Congress may populate Article III
courts with non-Article III personnel, such as magistrates. In short,
the Supreme Court has approved a wide range of non-Article III adju-
dicatory personnel.
Given this history, another position on the proposed "Commerce
Court" might recommend itself. The statute could be read as consti-
tutional, as have been many congressional decisions to create non-
Article III courts. Given the breadth of powers accorded Congress
under the Constitution, one could argue that the only unconstitutional
efforts by Congress to create courts would be those which exceed Con-
gress' authority under the Constitution. Since the proposed "Com-
merce Court" falls squarely within the Article I grant to Congress of
the power "to regulate Commerce. . . among the several States," the
statute easily survives this test. And, one might add, so would most
other proposed courts, since the Constitution provides Congress with
a broad mandate to govern the country. Given the extent of congres-
sional powers, Congress would have plenary authority to deploy
courts as needed to meet dispute resolution demands. This approach
offers clarity and flexibility.
Reality, however, defeats this approach as well. The Supreme
Court has consistently (and recently) refused to read Article III as
providing Congress plenary authority to create non-Article III
courtS?3 Rather, the Court has insisted upon limits to congressional
authority to create adjudicatory institutions outside Article III. In the
Court's and in commentators' discussions, there are persistent asser-
tions of the need for Article III courts and of concern that, were Con-
gress permitted unchecked authority to create non-Article III
adjudicatory institutions, then Congress would do SO.24
But these assertions assume an answer to the question: is there
such a politically important role for Article III courts that we should
claim a constitutionally-mandated arena and forbid some or all con-
22. The 1978 Bankruptcy amendments, 28 U.S.C. §§ 151-60 (1982), created an intermediate case.
See infra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
23. See Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Oil, 458 U.S. 50 (1982), discussed infra notes
77-107 and accompanying text. See also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. I (1957) (service-people's spouses
cannot be tried abroad by military tribunals); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969) (military
personnel cannot be court-martialed for crimes committed off the military base).
24. Some commentators believe that the Constitution compels the existence of only the Supreme
Court, while the lower courts' existence is totally dependent upon Congress. The debate is set forth and
joined in Gunther, Congressional Power to Curtail Federal Court Jurisdiction: An Opinionated Guide to
the Ongoing Debate, 36 STAN. L. REV. 895 (1984); Clinton, A Mandatory View ofFederal Court Juris-
diction, A Guided Questfor the Original Understanding ofArticle III, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 741 (1984);
and Sager, Foreword. Constitutional Limitations on Congress' Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of
the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L. REv. 17 (1981).
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gressional incursions into Article III turf? Is there some way to make
sense of the Supreme Court's efforts to preserve Article III courts and
yet permit Congress to create non-Article III courts? Although the
Supreme Court is clear that there are some limits to congressional
power, that Article III imposes them, and that the Supreme Court will
enforce them, the Court has great difficulty articulating what the lim-
its are and why the lines have been drawn as they have. The task is to
have an affirmative deijnition of situations which demand the qualities
ascribed to Article III courts, and to be able to identify the harms, if
any, which would flow from the creation of non-Article III courts.
How, if at all, would the world be diminished if courts like my hypo-
thetical Commerce Court came into being?
III. THE "COMMERCE COURT'S" FAILINGS
As noted, the hypothetical statute fails Article III requirements
in two respects. Appointed for twelve-year terms, the judges are not
given life tenure; indeed, if the statute is repealed, they could lose their
jobs completely. Further, although provided with a base salary of
$60,000, the new judges' compensation could be diminished from year
to year by subsequent legislation. It is accepted wisdom that life tenure
and salary guarantees are important to preserve judicial independence
by freeing judges from fears of being fired. Numerous articles and
opinions describe the centrality-both to the framers and to present
day commentators-of two forms of judicial independence: the struc-
turing of an independent branch of government empowered to check
excesses of coordinate branches and the creation of a cadre of in-
dependent individual judges, free from threats of coercion and there-
fore assumed able to judge impartially.25 Whether life tenure actually
begets impartiality is difficult to assess; a more straightforward as-
sumption is that life tenure protects judges from making decisions to
protect their own livelihoods.26
At an individual level, it is plain that, despite the Article III pro-
tections, some judges curry favor-in the hope of future appointment
to positions of greater power or simply out of a desire to be liked by
the powers that be. However, at a structural level, the Article III pro-
tections seem to have worked to imbue a group of individuals with a
perceived freedom from courting popularity and to permit (for better
25. E.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Oil, 458 U.S. 50, 74 (1982) (Brennan, J.,
plurality opinion); Ervin, Separation of Powers: Judicial Independence, 35 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
108 (1970).
26. An issue of concern in Association of Admin. Law Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132
(D.D.C. 1984).
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or worse) specific individuals to make "brave" or "foolhardy" (de-
pending upon one's views) decisions on some occasions. Article III
judges speak of themselves as the "checks" created by the Constitution
to "balance" the powers vested in the legislature and the executive.27
The hypothetical "Commerce Court" statute provides no such protec-
tions, but then neither do several other pieces of legislation approved
by the Supreme Court.
Given the Court's own descriptions of the import of Article III, it
is all the more puzzling why a majority of the Court has consistently
been willing to permit incursions into Article III and has allowed Con-
gress the power to create less than fully independent "courts." A brief
review of some of the major opinions condoning non-Article III courts
provides only a partial explanation.
The first major Article III opinion was American Insurance
Company v. Canter,28 decided in 1828 by Chief Justice Marshall and
involving a dispute about ownership of cotton. The question was the
enforceability of an order by a court that Congress had created for the
territory of Florida. David Canter claimed that he was a bona fide
purchaser of 356 bales which had been sold at a salvage auction pursu-
ant to an order of the Florida territorial court, an institution created
by what Chief Justice Marshall described as "the territorial legislature
of Florida"29-to wit, the United States Congress. If the order of that
territorial court was valid, then Canter was the rightful owner. How-
ever, American Insurance Company, which had insured the cargo,
claimed that the territorial court had no jurisdiction over the salvaged
cargo; American Insurance argued that, as underwriter, it was the
lawful owner. A United States district court agreed, and American
Insurance succeeded in obtaining restitution.30 Losing at the circuit
level, American Insurance argued to the Supreme Court that the Con-
stitution applied in full force to the territories, that Article III vested
judicial power, and specifically power over all cases in admiralty and
maritime, in courts created under Article III, and therefore that the
territorial court lacked the power to order a salvage sale.3l
27. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 20, at 689. See also Edwards, The Role ofa Judge in Modern
Society, 32 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 385 (1983); Johnson, Judicial Independence, 40 ALA. LAW. IS (1979).
28. I Pet. 511 (1828). As discussed infra notes 37-38 and accompanying text, the Article III issue
in Canter appears to be of secondary importance to the Court; only in retrospect did Canter become the
first "major" Article III opinion. This revisionist view of Canter is understandable; the entire issue of
Article IIArticle III courts is largely a result of developments in adjudicative structures of the last sixty
years. The seminal history of the federal courts, the Frankfurter and Landis treatise, supra note 12,
makes no mention of the Canter case.
29. I Pet. at 541.
30. I F. Cas. 658 (D.S.C. 1892) (No. 302a).
31. I Pet. at SIS.
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Chief Justice Marshall used the Canter opinion as an occasion to
pronounce on the power of the United States as a nation to acquire
"territory, either by conquest or by treaty.'>32 Since the "right to gov-
ern" was an "inevitable consequence" of the "right to acquire terri-
tory,"33 Congress had authority to create courts-as long as those
courts did not violate the Constitution. Thereafter, the opinion be-
comes a bit circular. Marshall reasoned that, because the Florida
judges served for limited terms, they did not sit in "constitutional
courts" but rather in "legislative courtS."34 Marshall held such courts
legitimate because they were created by Congress, exercising in the
territories "the combined powers of the general, and of a state govern-
ment."3S Marshall's view is premised upon the theory that, when gov-
erning the territories, Congress was not "Congress" but was the
functional equivalent of a state legislature. Since Article III limited
the freedom of Congress only when it acted as "Congress" to create
United States courts, Article III did not constrain Congress when it
acted as not-Congress.36
A traditional explanation of the Canter opinion is that it is about
efficiency-that it was sensible not to require life-tenured judges for
the territories because these lands would eventually become states.
The approval of "legislative courts" was viewed as Marshall's clever
finesse to avoid the problem of surplus judges.37 I beg to differ. Mar-
shall's opinion reads as a treatise on why Congress had the power,
without constitutional amendment, to acquire land for the nation.
That issue was the subject of contemporary debate, apparently quieted
by Marshall's ruling.38 The Canter opinion treats the issue of legisla-
32. [d. at 542.
33. [d. at 543.
34. [d. at 546.
35. [d.
36. Compare the view of Congress as having limited powers in the territories in Dred Scott v.
Sanford, 19 How. 393 (1856). The dissent by Justice Curtis pointed out the inconsistency with Canter.
19 How. at 613. See also D. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTI CASE 293 (1978) (Canter often cited
by Republicans during the debate over the Missouri Compromise as authority for congressional power
to prohibit slavery in the territories).
37. See Justice Harlan's exposition of Canter in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543-47
(1962) (discussing some of the "practical problems arising from the ... administration" of the territo-
ries ); see also H. HART AND H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM, 378-
79 (2d ed. 1973).
38. Deutsch, The Constitutionality of the Louisiana Purchase, 53 A.B.A.J. 50 (1967) (Florida ac-
quisition raised the same issue but was quieted by the Canter opinion. [d. at 52, 57). See E. BROWN,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 01' THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 15-35 (1920) (major contemporary
debate about the constitutionality of acquiring territories); A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTION, ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT, 207-210 (1976) (at the time of the Lousiana
Purchase, there was considerable controversy about whether Congress had the constitutional authority
to acquire land; art. IV, § 3 only speaks of Congress' power to admit new "states").
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tive courts as secondary and devotes little discussion to the virtues of
Article III. However, the opinion has come to serve as the corner-
stone of the doctrine that Congress has the authority-at least some-
times-to create "legislative courts."
The Canter opinion is difficult to assimilate into the generally ac-
cepted theory of Article III that its purpose is to ensure a federal court
system independent of Congress and the executive. Since, under
Canter, it is permissible to have Article I judges decide Article III
business in the territories, why not have Article I judges decide Article
III business elsewhere? Indeed, why insist upon Article III judges at
all? The response, not terribly persuasive, is that the need for checks
and balances diminishes in the territories, because. . . . I suppose,
because the "territories are the territories."39
When read this way, Canter may be insufficient to take us very far
toward a definition of Article III courts that has much import today.
The Canter opinion can be understood as circular but clear. The terri-
torial courts were not subjected to Article III strictures because the
judges did not have life tenure and the judges did not have to have life
tenure because they were territorial (not federal) judges. Thus, under
Canter it is relatively easy to uphold non-Article III judges deciding
Article III cases in the District of Columbia and in other federal en-
claves,40 but Canter is somewhat less vibrant as a basis for upholding
non-Article III courts established for entities not physically delineated
and accorded special status.
There is one thread in Canter, however, which does support a
broader exercise of congressional court-making authority. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall concluded that the territorial courts were valid either
because of the "general right of sovereignty which exists in the govern-
ment" or because of "that clause [Article IV, section 3] which enables
Congress to make all needful rules and regulations respecting the terri-
tory belonging to the United States."41 While this section of the opin-
ion might be read in context as only further support for congressional
power to acquire territories, the opinion might also be understood as
an endorsement of congressional authority to act, pursuant to its con-
39. Justice Harlan offered a version of this argument in Glidden v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 546
(1962) ("the realities of territorial government typically made it less urgent that judges there enjoy the
independence from Congress and the President envisioned by [Article III]. For the territories were not
ruled immediately from Washington; in a day of poor roads and slow mails, it was unthinkable that
they should be").
40. Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 10 (1883) (upholding the constitutionality of non·Article III
courts for the District of Columbia); Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1906) (upholding the constitu-
tionality of the Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court). See generally Katz, Federal Legislative
Courts, 43 HARV. L. REV. 894 (1929-30).
41. I Pet. at 546.
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stitutionally enumerated powers, to create courts in areas other than
those related to the territories. Since there are also clauses which
enable Congress to make rules and regulations respecting commerce,
the coinage of money, the governance of the armed forces, and to
carry out any of its or the executive's powers, why not a series of "leg-
islative courts" to adjudicate a range of business? If a clause in Article
IV can support territorial courts, why not rely on the clauses of Arti-
cle I to support a variety of courts, such as military courts, bankruptcy
courts, and commerce courts?
As is familiar, the Supreme Court has expressly upheld congres-
sional authority to establish military courts,42 although jurisdiction of
those courts is bounded.43 In those cases, the Court has underscored
the distinctiveness of the subject matter. The analysis is that the mili-
tary is the military. But in both the territorial and military court dis-
cussions, the subject matter does itself lend some basis for delineating
congressional authority. The cases heard by these courts are under-
stood (somehow) as not at the core of the business of the United States
courts. The institutions-the army, navy, and territories-are discrete
almost quasi-distinct entities, all of which have some tradition of sep-
arate governance. The Supreme Court opinions upholding separate
courts for the military, however, also rely upon a broader justification:
the enumerated grants of power to Congress in Article 1.44 The Court
seems ambivalent as it both assumes limits and affirms the substantial
powers of Congress to create courts. Given the broad language of
these opinions, the hypothetical "Commerce Court" could be
constitutional.
There are two other kinds of cases which provide the most com-
plicated and relevant precedents for current understandings of the
meaning of Article III. One group of opinions is often denominated
the "public rights" cases. The title emerges because the litigation is
between an individual and the United States government. The classic
example, an 1856 case, Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land and Im-
provement Company, was a dispute about the collection of debts owed
by a federal customs officer.4s The Solicitor of the Treasury ordered
the customs officer's property sold, the sale was contested, and one
argument advanced was that an Article III judge, rather than an exec-
utive branch official, should have ordered the sale. At the time (long
before the "due process revolution"), debts could be satisfied by
42. Relford v. Commandant. U.S. Disciplinary Barracks, Ft. Leavenworth, Kan., 401 U.S. 355
(1971); United States ex reI. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955).
43. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1968).
44. Ex Parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13,21 (1879).
45. 18 How. 272 (1856).
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seizure.46 The Supreme Court, upholding the sale, reasoned that no
infringement of Article III values had occurred because the entire is-
sue could have been determined without any judicial intervention.
Since the problem could have been handled without courts, Congress
or the executive was free to create institutions or to vest individuals
with power to order the sale of debtors' property.47
The underlying assumption of the old "public rights" cases was
that (despite the term "rights") the citizens possessed no "rights" cog-
nizable in court. To the extent that disputes occurred between citizen
and government, those disputes were enabled by a generous sovereign,
waiving immunity. In that world, with "privileges" and "gratuities"
instead of "entitlements,"48 there was no judicial turf to invade. As
the Supreme Court explained in Murray's Lessee, the disputes were
not "necessarily ... [a] judicial controversy."49 The "public rights"
cases emerged in a world with assumptions quite at odds with those of
today. However, the opinion continues to be cited as evidence of the
existence of an ill-defined but extant category of cases, involving con-
troversies between the federal government and its citizens, often re-
lated to statutory rights, and appropriately decided (at least in the first
instance) by non-Article III courts.50
The second group of precedents is represented by Crowell v. Ben-
son.51 This 1932 opinion takes the "public rights" category a step fur-
ther. In Crowell, the dispute was between two private citizens, an
employer and an employee, and the question was whether the em-
ployer (Benson) had to pay worker compensation benefits to the em-
ployee (Knudson), who had suffered injuries while working on a
derrick barge moored in the Mobile River in Alabama.52 Knudson
sought recovery under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation ACt,53 Deputy Commissioner Crowell, of the United
States Employees' Compensation Commission, found for employee
Knudson over Benson's objection that Knudsen had not been his em-
ployee performing "service upon the navigable waters of the United
46. 18 How. at 279, citing Act of July 14, 1789, ch. 75, § 15, 1 Stat. 602. See also Currie, Bank-
ruptcy Judges and the Independent Judiciary, 16 CREIGTON L. REV. 441, 450 (1983) (explaining limited
relevance of Murray's Lessee for contemporary cases).
47. 18 How. at 283.
48. As we have come to understand them by reading Charles Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE
L.J. 733 (1964).
49. 18 How. at 281.
50. See, e.g., Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Oil, 458 U.S. at 67 (plurality opinion);
Currie, supra note 46, at 449·58, 463-65.
51. 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
52. Crowell v. Benson, 45 F.2d 66 (5th Cir. 1930).
53. Act of March 4, 1927, Pub. L. No. 803, ch. 509,44 Stat. 1424 (current version at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901-950 (1982».
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States.,,54 Benson challenged enforcement of the decision in federal
district court. Benson claimed the statute unconstitutionally vested
judicial authority in the deputy commissioner, and the trial court
judge agreed.55 The judge then heard the case de novo and held for
Benson on the grounds that the injury had not occurred in a manner
covered by the Longshoremen's Act.56
Thus, the Supreme Court was presented with a challenge,
grounded in Article III, that implicated the validity of worker com-
pensation schemes and of administrative adjudication. In a Solomonic
move, the Court "split the difference"; it upheld Congress' decision to
place adjudicatory power in a non-Article III institution and yet si-
multaneously permitted the Article III judge's ruling to stand, and
Benson, the employer, to prevai1,57 While somewhat murky, the
Court's justifications rested upon the statute's allocation of responsi-
bilities between deputy commissioners and Article III judges. Under
the Act, a deputy commissioner had no authority to enforce awards;
rather, awards were to be enforced by a district court if made "in ac-
cordance with law," or set aside, if "not in accordance with law.,,58
Chief Justice Hughes, for the majority, relied on that division of au-
thority to conclude that the Act provided for "the reservation of legal
questions" to Article III judges.59 In the Court's view, since the fed-
eral district court was statutorily empowered to rule, the Act did not
violate Article 111.60
Struggling to make sense of the legislation in the Article III con-
text, the majority groped to develop its premises. Crowell was not the
typical "public rights" agency case, for it was not a civil dispute be-
tween the United States and its citizens. As the Crowell Court ac-
knowledged, the lawsuit involved a "private right, that is the liability
of one individual to another under the law as defined."61 As such, the
case was "a subject for judicial determination."62 Nevertheless, the
Court held that delegation of decisionmaking was permissible, so long
as the administrative adjudicator had some dependence upon Article
III judges. The Court found solace in its interpretation of the Act
which permitted the decision of a deputy commissioner to be trumped
54. Pub. L. No. 803, ch. 509, § 3,44 Stat. 1426 (1927) (current version at 33 U.S.C. § 903 (1982».
55. 45 F.2d at 67.
56. Id.
57. 285 U.S. at 62-63.
58. Act of March 4, 1927, ch. 509, §§ 21(b) -21(c), 44 Stat. 1436 (current version at 33 U.S.C.
§ 921 (1982».
59. 285 U.S. at 49.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 51.
62. Id. at 49 (quoting Murray's Lessee, 18 How. at 284).
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by the ruling of an Article III judge. That judge explicitly retained the
authority to enforce awards and implicitly was accorded authority to
review and to remake, de novo, the "legislative judge's" decision.
The majority's complex balancing act is evident in the problem-
atic compromise made. The opinion is laced with language suggesting
the majority's concerns for the pragmatics, the growing needs for inex-
pensive adjudicatory techniques. In language well-suited to contem-
porary opinions, the Court emphasized that the purpose of the Act
was to "furnish a prompt, continuous, expert, and inexpensive method
for dealing" with a class of cases.63 However, the majority's decision
undercut those purposes by authorizing not only review of commis-
sioners' decisions but also de novo decisionmaking in federal district
court.
The Crowell majority justified de novo review by distinguishing
between agency factfinding and something that the Court called "the
essential attributes of judicial power.,,64 The opinion did not affirma-
tively define "the essential attributes of judicial power," which has be-
come an important phrase. The Court did suggest that some species of
factfinding fell within the boundaries of "essential attributes"; federal
judges had to have the power to decide, de novo, "jurisdictional
facts.,,6s In dramatic rhetoric, the Chief Justice spoke of the imper-
missible divestiture of all factfinding from Article III courts, which
"would be to sap the judicial power as it exists under the federal Con-
stitution, and to establish a government of a bureaucratic character
alien to our system."66
63. [d. at 46.
64. [d. at 51. Insofar as a Lexis search reveals, this phrase was introduced to Supreme Court
opinions in Crowell.
65. 285 U.S. at 56-58. The Court rested its acceptance of a division of authority between agency
decisionmaker and Article III judge, in part, on the model of the dilfering functions of the jury as
factfinder and the judge as law maker. [d. at 61. The Court did not explore the dilfering political and
ritualistic functions of the community-based jury system and of the bureaucratic agency adjudication.
Congress has also drawn the factllaw distinction in some of its debates about how to structure
agency adjudication; occasionally, agency factfinding has been equated with jury factfinding. For ex-
ample, Congress defeated proposals to require in the Federal Trade Commission Act that agency deci-
sions be subjected to de novo judicial review. Instead, a "substantial evidence" standard was adopted.
51 CoNG. REC. 12993, 13045 (1914). It appears that members of Congress equated that standard of
review with the standard used for jury verdicts and believed that agency factfinding was thus given the
same degree of finality as was accorded jury factfinding. See E. Stason, "Substantial Evidence" in
Administrative Law, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1026, 1042-46 (1941). (My thanks to Ray Solomon for bringing
this parallel to my attention.) See also K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 29.02 at 527-30 (1972).
For discussion of whether Article I tribunals unconstitutionally limit the right to a jury trial as guaran-
teed by the seventh amendment, see Luneberg and Nordenberg, Specially Qualified Juries and Expert
Nonjury Tribunals: Alternatives for Coping with the Complexities ofModern Civil Litigation, 67 VA. L.
REV. 887,950-90 (1981).
66. 285 U.S. at 57.
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Crowell is a complicated case, which appears to have been viewed
at the time as sharply limiting the power of administrative agencies67
but whose formulations have today become the basis for the Court's
approval of the widespread use of administrative adjudication. In
some sense, the Crowell opinion provided a model for the administra-
tive adjudication that followed. When establishing administrative
agencies, Congress appeared to nod in Crowell's direction by splitting
off enforcement functions and giving them to Article III courtS.68
Congress also mimicked the Crowell dependency model (deputy com-
missioner as supervised by and reliant upon an Article III judge) when
it authorized increased powers for magistrates.69
The 1978 Bankruptcy Act,7° however, was an important excep-
tion to this general description of congressional allocation of authority
between administrative agency or judicial surrogate and Article III
judge,7! The Act created bankruptcy "judges," who were not quite
67. E.g., Comment, Judicial Review ofAdministrative Findings-Crowell v. Benson, 41 YALE LJ.
1037 (1932) ("The consequence of an erroneous determination ... by the administrative is limited to
the payment by the employer ... of ... at the most $25 per week 'during the ... disability,' " id. at
1053; the Court has rendered a decision that will "haunt" the country "for many years," id. at 1056);
Note, Crowell v. Benson: Inquiries and Conjectures, 46 HARV. L. REV. 478, 490 (1932-33) (danger that
Crowell will "seriously diminish the future effectiveness" of administrative decisions).
There is an interesting political dimension to Crowell, decided by the Supreme Court in the midst
of the depression. The agency administrator in Crowell had found for the worker; the Article III judge
had overturned the decision and found for the employer. Had the Court found the delegation of au-
thority unconstitutional under Article III, then other federal administrative adjudication systems would
have been placed in jeopardy. 285 U.S. at 70 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Had the Court reached the
broader grounds raised by the employer and found due process deficiencies in the agency decisionmak-
ing, then state as well as federal programs would have been of questionable legality. Perhaps that is
why Justice Brandeis, a justice much identified with progressive programs, raised the due process issue
in dissent and was eager for the Court to approve agency decisionmaking on constitutional grounds.
285 U.S. at 77-80. Brandeis' enthusiasm for administrative agencies is mirrored in Frankfurter's writ-
ings on the subject. See, e.g., Frankfurter, Introduction, A Symposium on Administrative Law Based
upon Legal Writings, 1931-33, 18 IOWA L. REV. 129 (1933); Frankfurter, The Task ofAdministrative
Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614 (1927); Frankfurter, Foreword. The Final Report ofthe Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 585 (1941); Frankfurter, Foreword, 47
YALE L.J. SIS (1938). The hoped-for salvation by administrative agencies has not materialized, see
Frug, The Ideology ofBureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1382 (1984) ("bureau-
cratic institutions as a form of domination").
68. There are numerous examples of statutes based upon the Crowell model, and many have been
approved by courts. E.g., Board of Trustees of the W. Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Thompson
Bldg. Materials, Inc., 749 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 2116 (1985) (upholding
Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendment Acts to ERISA, Pub. L. No. 96-364, 94 Stat. 1208 (1980),
which require mandatory arbitration with de novo review by courts of legal issues and review of factual
findings under a "clear preponderance of the evidence" standard); Carozza v. United States Steel Corp.,
727 F.2d 74 (3rd Cir. 1984) (upholding Labor Department's Benefits Review Board, 33 U.S.C.
§ 921(b)(3) (1982».
69. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) (1982) (for specified kinds of decisions, magistrates file "proposed findings
and recommendations," not final until the report is adopted by the district court judge).
70. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471, 1481 (1982).
71. See also 38 U.S.C. § 211(a) (1982) (decisions of Veterans Administration unreviewable), up-
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like administrative hearing officers, not quite a part of a fully separated
"legislative court" and not nearly as dependent upon Article III
judges as are magistrates. Although the 1978 amendments described
bankruptcy courts as "adjunct to the district court,'t72 the judges of
the bankruptcy court had broad jurisdiction, extending to all "civil
proceedings arising under" the Bankruptcy Act or "arising in or relat-
ing to cases" under the Bankruptcy Act.73 Moreover, bankruptcy
judges were vested with all the "powers of a court of equity, law and
admiralty"-save authority to enjoin other courts or impose criminal
contempt,74 Bankruptcy judges could also hold jury trials and issue
writs, orders, or process necessary to their jurisdiction.7s In short,
bankruptcy judges appeared suspiciously powerful and strikingly simi-
lar to federal judges. Bankruptcy judges enjoyed jurisdiction over a
range of cases and were quite free from needing others (such as Article
III judges) to enforce the orders rendered. What bankruptcy judges
lacked, however, were the protections of Article III. Bankruptcy
judges were appointed by the President for terms of fourteen years but
could be discharged by vote of a district court.76
Congress' decision in the 1978 bankruptcy law amendments to
break new ground in delineating the powers of bankruptcy judges set
the stage for the most important contemporary discussion of the "es-
sential attributes of judicial power"-the 1982 opinion, Northern Pipe-
line Construction Company v. Marathon OJ/.77 Upon challenge from a
litigant,78 the Supreme Court determined that the 1978 amendments
held in Gott v. Walters, 756 F.2d 902 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (denying veterans' challenge to VA's failure to
provide notice and comment for radiation program). See generally Rabin, Preclusion 0/Judicial Review
in the Processing a/Claims/or Veterans' Benefits: A Preliminary Analysis, 27 STAN. L. REv. 905 (1975)
(the "Veterans Administration stands in splendid isolation as the single administrative agency whose
major functions are insulated from judicial review"). Cf Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974)
(constitutional challenge to Veterans' Administration not barred) and Crowne v. Walters, No. 82-0827
(D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1985), 53 U.S.L.W. 2452 (jUdicial review of claims that VA misinterpreted its own
regulations).
72. 28 U.S.C. § 151(a) (1982).
73. 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (1982).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1481 (1982).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1480,451 (1982); II U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982) (amended 1984).
76. 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153 (1982). See Krattenmaker, Article III and Judicial Independence: Why
the New Bankruptcy Courts are Unconstitutional, 70 GEO. L.J. 297 (1981); Note, Article III Limits on
Article I Courts: The Constitutionality a/the Bankruptcy Court and the 1979 Magistrate Act, 80 COlUM.
L. REV. 560 (1980).
77. 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The plurality opinion did not well define the contours of its holding, and
concurrences argued that the unconstitutionality of the Bankruptcy Amendments was limited to the
conference of jurisdiction upon bankruptcy judges over cases "related to bankruptcy proceeedings," a
category which could conceivably include cases that had no other right of entry into the federal system.
458 U.S. at 90 (Rehnquist, J. ,concurring). See also Strauss, supra note 5, at 631 (that justices could
not agree on method of analysis of issues relating to constitutional structure was "astonishing").
78. The Court assumed that Marathon had standing to challenge the statute, although the Court
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were unconstitutional, at least in some respects. Justice Brennan
wrote for the plurality. He attempted, unsuccessfully in my judgment,
to cabin all the Supreme Court precedents permitting non-Article III
courts into three categories-territorial courts, military courts, and
"public rights" courtS.79 Justice Brennan argued that, apart from
what he described as these three discrete areas, the Court had not per-
mitted any incursions into Article III turf. Thus, Justice Brennan cre-
ated a presumption that all congressional creation of judicial officers
had to be in compliance with Article III-save in the "three narrow
situations" delineated.80
As Justice White in dissent fairly commented, the cases Justice
Brennan cited do not lend themselves to such limitations.8l As de-
scribed above, opinions like Canter need not intrinsically be read so
narrowly. More importantly, the third category, "public rights," does
not really exist as a discrete grouping, at least insofar as Justice Bren-
nan attempted to place Crowell v. Benson within it. 82 Crowell involved
litigation between two private citizens under a federal statute, and the
Crowell Court described itself as deciding a case of "private" rights. 83
At best, Crowell represents a fourth category: agency adjudication of
private rights that the public cares about. Furthermore, categories
three (public rights) and four (Crowell plus) are not "narrow" at all;
with the United States as a party in more than 40% of the cases on the
federal civil docket,84 these categories encompass a vast amount of to-
day's litigation. Even more devastating to the majority opinion is Jus-
tice White's central criticism: assuming that the precedents could be
confined to categories subject to delineation, why do the precedents
define the outer boundaries of what Congress can do outside the stric-
tures of Article 11I?85 Justice Brennan's implicit answer was: "hold
nowhere discussed the nature of the personalized injury requisite for standing under contemporary
doctrine. See. e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983). The kind of injury discussed
appears more akin to a separation of powers/structural and hence more "abstract" harm, typically
prohibited under the Court's standing jurisprudence. See. e.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Amer-
icans United for Separation of Church and State. 454 U.S. 464 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm.
to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
79. 458 U.S. at 64-69.
80. [d. at 64.
8I. [d. at 104.
82. [d. at 109. See also Currie, supra note 46, at 463-65; Monaghan, Marbury and the Adminis-
trative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. I, 18-20 (1983); Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies,
and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983 DUKE L. J. 197,206-14 (all commenting on the difficulties in
Justice Brennan's analysis of "public rights" cases).
83. 285 U.S. at 5I.
84. 1984 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 2, at 131.
85. 458 U.S. at 101.
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.that line." What has been permitted cannot now be undone but Con-
gress will not be authorized to go beyond the current parameters.
Justice White offered a different approach. He proposed a balanc-
ing test; when reviewing congressional schemes creating non-Article
III courts, Justice White urged that the Supreme Court weigh Article
III values of independence against the need for the proposed place-
ment of adjudication elsewhere.86 On that scale, the Justice believed
that the Bankruptcy Act was constitutional because he thought the
subject matter apolitical and the volume of cases astronomical.87
But despite Justice White's telling criticisms, Justice Brennan's
opinion requires more examination. Justice Brennan attempted (not
wholly satisfactorily) to provide some affirmative statement of what
domain belongs uniquely to Article III judges. First, Justice Brennan
offered a familiar but detailed discussion of the virtues of judicial inde-
pendence and of its centrality in the constitutional scheme.88 The pur-
pose of the discussion seems to be to impress upon Congress the
constraints imposed upon it by Article III. The Northern Pipeline
opinion was written at a time when the debate about congressional
control of federal court jurisdiction was intense. Bills had been intro-
duced in Congress to divest both the Supreme Court and lower federal
courts of jurisdiction over such issues as abortion and busing.89 Jus-
tice Brennan's plurality opinion may have had purposes beyond the
invalidation of the Bankruptcy Act, a piece of legislation that ap-
peared less political than many others.
Second, Justice Brennan evoked the crucial, if mystical, phrase
from Crowell v. Benson, "essential attributes of judicial power," as he
struggled to delineate a line that Congress cannot cross without en-
croaching upon the constitutional preserves of Article III courts.90
The sources for his discussion are history and tradition. Groping for
some constitutional parameters for the definition of Article III courts
or their cases, Justice Brennan described the quintessential judicial
moment as the adjudication of a dispute between private parties.
86. Id. at lIS.
87. Id. Justice White cited the 254,000 bankruptcy proceedings filed in 1977. Id. at 117 n.16.
88. Id. at 57-60.
89. E.g., S. 528, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to eliminate Supreme Court and lower court juris-
diction over assignment of students to public schools); S. 583, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981) (to eliminate
Supreme Court and lower court jurisdiction to review state abortion laws). The controversy over the
constitutionality of these bills is outlined in Sager, supra note 24, and in Clinton, supra note 24. Similar
bills have once again been introduced. See S. 37, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (to eliminate the jurisdic.
tion of the lower federal courts to order student school assignments on the basis of race); S. 47, 99th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1985) (to prohibit lower federal courts from reviewing state laws permitting prayers in
the public schools).
90. 458 U.S. at 78.
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There is some irony here. To the extent that we care abou~ having
Article III judges make decisions, it would seem that the "private
rights" cases have the least claim. First, those cases are traditionally
the business ofthe state, not the federal, courts. If the efforts to elimi-
nate federal diversity jurisdiction are successful,91 as many Article III
judges urge,92 a substantial portion of "private rights" cases will no
longer be before the federal courtS.93 Second, the cases in which the
independence of the federal court seems most essential are those in
which a judge must adjudicate a claim of government mistake, over-
reaching or misconduct-that large block of cases on the federal
docket in which the United States is a party.94 The historically-based
"private rights" model provides an anachronistic justification to ex-
plain why the exercise of federal judicial authority under Article III is
important and must be safeguarded.95
But Justice Brennan offered more than decisionmaking in private
cases to describe the "essentially" judicial power that Article III
judges alone may possess. Justice Brennan argued that federal judges
have essential roles because they are generalists, whose dockets in-
clude criminal as well as civil cases, and whose broad domain con-
trasts to the specialists who undertake adjudication in agencies.96 This
argument requires more explanation than the opinion furnishes. Why
should broad jurisdictional grants, rather than narrow ones, define an
Article III judge? One possibility is protection of that judge from bias
or exhaustion. We know that administrative law judges are sometimes
asked to be loyal to the statutory schemes that they, in some sense,
91. Recent attempts (all failed) to abolish or modify diversity jurisdiction include: H.R. 2404,
97th Cong., lst Sess. (1981); S. 679, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); H.R. 130, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
92. E.g., H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 139-52 (1973); Dork, Deal-
ing with the Overload in Article III Courts, 70 F.R.D. 231, 236-37 (1976); Burger, Annual Report on the
State of the Judiciary, 62 A.B.A.J. 443 (1976). A 1977 survey indicated that more than 56% of the
federal circuit and district court judges polled favored elimination of diversity jurisdiction. Shapiro,
Federal Diversity Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 334 (1977).
93. In 1984, diversity cases numbered 56,000 and thus comprised 21.5% of the federal civil
docket. 1984 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 2, at 131.
94. It might be argued that, when the United States is a party, public attention is focused upon a
case and thus judicial behavior is constrained. However, with the United States a party to some
148,712 civil and criminal actions filed in 1984, public scrutiny is, at best, diffused over a mass of cases.
1984 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE REPORT, supra note 2, at 131, 166.
95. Similarly, the constitutionally-provided original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court appears to
have outlived its usefulness. The Court has construed the grant narrowly to limit its application. See 28
U.S.C. § 1251 (1982); Il1inois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93-94 (1972) (permitting concurrent
jurisdiction in the district court); Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109, 113-14 (1972)
(same). Cf South Carolina v. Regan, 104 S. Ct. 1107, 1116 (1984) (permitting filing under original
jurisdiction).
96. 458 U.S. at 78·80.
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administer.97 If federal judges also became identified with a narrow
jurisdictional grant, they might develop attitudes toward the scheme
which would undermine the freshness that a generalist would bring to
it. In addition, where there are specialty courts, there is also increased
visibility of decisionmaking. The opinions rendered in a given area
can more readily be quantified and the judges identified as for or
against a particular side-thus undermining the legitimacy of suppos-
edly neutral decisionmakers.98 Another concern is prestige. Narrow
jurisdictional grants define less powerful actors who in turn hold less
desirable positions. Federal judges gain power from being the elite
and they are, functionally, to be distinguished from agency judges by
the broad grant ofjurisdiction from which Article III judges operate.99
However well one might flesh out and make more meaningful this
attribute of being a generalist, there remains one central flaw. There
have been and are Article III courts, such as the Temporary Emer-
gency Court of Appeals loo and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit,101 with narrow jurisdictional grants. Furthermore most peo-
ple, including Justice Brennan, assumed that one "cure" for the un-
constitutionality of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act was to give bankruptcy
judges Article III powers. 102 Thus, while most Article III judges cur-
rently are generalists and while being generalists may enhance those
judges' power, all Article III judges are not and probably do not have
to be generalists. 103
97. Association of Admin. Judges, Inc. v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132 (D.D.C. 1984).
98. Apparently, this visibility and identification of court with case led to the demise of the real
Commerce Court, abolished in 1913. See MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE. supra note 12; and Dill, supra
note 12, at 254.
99. Tushnet, Invitation to a Wedding: Some Thoughts on Article III and a Problem ofStatutory
Interpretation, 60 IOWA L. REV. 937, 952-53 (1975) (distinction between agencies and courts to be
made on functional basis).
100. There have been two such courts, staffed by federal district and appellate court judges. See
Emergency Price Control Act, Pub. L. No. 421, § 204, 56 Stat. 23 (1942). The Emergency Court of
Appeals had exclusive jurisdiction to review regulations promulgated by the Price Control Administra-
tor. The court was abolished by the Act of June 30, 1952, ch. 530, title I, § 121(b), 66 Stat. 305 (1952).
See also Economic Stabilization Act Amendments of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-210, 85 Stat. 743 (1971)
(creating the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals, with jurisdiction over wage and price control).
The court's existence was extended and its jurisdiction altered by the Energy Policy and Conservation
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-163, 89 Stat. 871 (1975) and by the Emergency Petroleum Allocation Act, .15
U.S.c. § 717 (1982).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1982) (exclusive jurisdiction over (inter alia) all appeals from the United
States Claims Court, the Board of Patent Appeals, the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, the
United States Court of International Trade, the Merit Systems Protection Board, and all final decisions
of federal district courts involving patents).
102. 458 U.S. at 74-75, n.28.
103. There appears to be little written on the specific question of how or why Article III would
bar Congress from creating a series of specialty Article III courts. As noted, most of the literature
assumes that such courts are possible. Further, the Supreme Court has sanctioned non-Article III
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But I have not exhausted Justice Brennan's list of "essential at-
tributes." Justice Brennan shifted his emphasis from control over cat-
egories of cases (private cases and a wide range of them) to claims
about the stages at which Article III judges must exercise control. For
Justice Brennan, a third "essential attribute of judicial power" is that
Article III judges have the authority to issue final judgments and the
ability to enforce those judgments by an array of powers in general
and contempt in particular. 104 According to Justice Brennan, an Arti-
cle III judge can compel individuals to behave in specific ways and
that power distinguished the judge from non-Article III actors. And,
in fact, most agency decisionmakers lacked such authority,105 while
the bankruptcy judges created by the 1978 amendments did not.
In sum, the packet of judicial attributes that Justice Brennan re-
lied upon to justify the importance of preserving the domain of Article
III judges are 1) adjudication of private disputes, 2) control over a
broad jurisdictional grant, including the criminal law, and 3) powers
of finality and of contempt to enforce one's decisions. 106 Assume (for
the moment) that Justice Brennan's formulation is accurate. 107 At
least upon first appraisal, there is something unsatisfactory in this list.
It looks rather skimpy to support the impressive rhetoric about the
absolute need for an independent judiciary. Are Article III judges
mandated by the Constitution only for' this? to decide private cases?
hear lots of different kinds of cases? and issue final decisions? If this is
all that is the essential preserve of Article III, then one wonders
whether the definition of "essential attributes of judicial power" will
courts with broad jurisdictional grants (albeit over a defined area), so that the general versus specific
jurisdiction distinction does not have a compelling quality. E.g., Palmore v. United States, 413 U.S.
389, 409 (1973) (District of Columbia's local non-Article III court system with jurisdiction over "the
great mass of litigation, civil and criminal" upheld). See generally Katz, supra note 40.
104. 458 U.S. at 85.
105. For example, the NLRB must go to federal court to enforce its orders, 29 U.S.C. § 16O(e)
(1982), as must the Commodities Exchange Commission, 7 U.S.C. § IS (1982), to enforce subpoenas
issued by the Commission, and the Consumer Product Safety Commission, IS U.S.C. §§ 2064, 2070-71
(1982) to enforce civil and criminal penalties.
106. Article III protections are rarely justified on the ground that they prevent judicial corrup-
tion. The absence of such an argument can probably be explained by the implicit criticism such a thesis
would level at state courts. To claim that Article III inhibits corruption would be to suggest that state
court judges, lacking Article III attributes, are more corrupt than their federal counterparts. On an
empirical level, there appears to be no way to test such a proposition. Even if it were possible to control
for numbers, the many variables (such as the different jurisdiction of the federal and state courts and
hence the differing kinds of problems and potentially corrupt situations) and the fact that the federal
government investigates allegations of judicial corruption in the state courts but the state governments
do not inquire into alleged federal judicial corruption would undermine the probative value of such an
endeavor.
107. For Justice Brennan's more recent efforts to define "judicial proceedings" in a non-Article
III context, see District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983) (investigation,
declaration, and enforcement of rights are judicial functions).
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have any more analytic force than the much~tnaligned and recently
disavowed phrase from National League of Cities-"tradi.tional as-
pects of state sovereignty." 108 Moreover, even if these attributes define
the "judicial power," then presumably many forms of "adjuncts" to
Article III courts would be constitutionally permissible as long as the
adjuncts were not given too broad a grant of power or the ability to
make and enforce final judgments.
IV. THE "COMMERCE COURT" AS ADJUNCT
One question in light of Northern Pipeline is whether my hypo-
thetical Commerce Court would be saved by a simple addition to the
statute:
All Commerce Court judges will be adjuncts to Article III judges,
who shall issue final orders in all cases decided by Commerce
Court judges.
Of course, the models here are several. The 1984 amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act and the 1976 and 1979 amendments to the Magis-
trates Act all rely upon this adjunct quality. Under the most recent
bankruptcy statute, for example, bankruptcy judges' decisions over
"non-core" Article III business are not final but rather are "proposed
findings of fact and recommendations" to be reconsidered by an Arti-
cle III judge. 109 Similarly, under recent amendments to the Magis-
trates Act, many magistrates' rulings are proposed findings, subjected
to a "de novo determination" by the federal district court judge who is
formally the author of the decisions. 110 The question is whether such
formalities suffice.
The Supreme Court has specifically upheld a broad grant of au-
thority to magistrates under this adjunct model. In 1977, in a motion
to the district court, criminal defendant Herman Raddatz asked that
incriminating statements he had made be suppressed. He claimed the
statements were made in conjunction with an agreement, subsequently
breached by the government, to have charges against him dis-
missed. 111 Pursuant to section 636(b) of the Magistrates Act and over
Mr. Raddatz's objections, the district judge referred the suppression
motion to a magistrate, who heard testimony from Raddatz and from
108. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 849 (1976). The premise of National
League of Cities, that the tenth amendment protects aspects of states' sovereignty from congressional
regulation, was overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985).
The majority in Garcia concluded that, in light of the changing nature of governmental activities, defin-
ing "traditional aspects of state sovereignty" was impossible. [d. at 1016.
109. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 346, Title I, § 104 (amending 28 U.s.C. § 157(c)(I) (1982».
110. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982).
III. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 670-71 (1980).
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the two Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms agents who had
questioned Raddatz. The magistrate found that Raddatz had "know-
ingly, intelligently, and voluntarily made inculpatory statements"1l2
and recommended that the suppression motion be denied. In support
of his report, the magistrate stated that he had found the testimony of
the federal agents "more credible" than that of Mr. Raddatz. 113 Rad-
datz objected to the report and recommendation of the magistrate-
thereby requiring the district judge to perfonn the statutory obligation
embodied in 28 U.S.C. section 636(b) of making a "de novo detenni-
nation." 114 The judge infonned the parties that he had considered the
transcript of the magistrate's hearing, the parties' written submissions
and counsels' arguments, and that he "adopted" the magistrate's re-
port and recommendation. 115 The statements were not suppressed.
After being found guilty, Mr. Raddatz appealed to the Seventh
Circuit, which reversed. The court concluded that, when the credibil-
ity of witnesses was in issue, the district judge was obliged as a matter
of due process to hear the witnesses. 116 The United States Supreme
Court reversed the appellate court and upheld the trial judge's mini-
mal review of the magistrate's findings as sufficient under the Magis-
trates Act, the due process clause and Article 111. 117 The majority
opinion, written by Chief Justice Burger, first determined that the leg-
islative choice of the words "de novo detennination," rather than "de
novo hearing," was a deliberate decision not to require repetitive hear-
ings. 118 Further, as a matter of due process, acceptance of magistrates'
findings did not violate the right to be heard. 119 Finally, Article III
posed no barrier; in some measure, Crowell v. Benson had paved the
way. But, while in Crowell "de novo" meant a new factfinding hear-
ing at which new evidence could be submitted,120 in Raddatz, "de
novo" required only that the trial judge review the papers. Such "del-
egation" did not "violate" Article III "so long as the ultimate deci-
sion" was made by the district court. 121
112. [d. at 671.
113. United States v. Raddatz, 592 F.2d 976, 979 (7th Cir. 1979).
114. 28 U.S.c. § 636(b)(1) (1982).
115. United States v. Raddatz, No. 77 Cr. 325, App. E to certiorari petition at 33a, of United
States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667 (1980).
116. 592 F.2d at 986.
117. 447 U.S. at 680-81.
118. [d. at 676.
119. [d. at 680-81. The Court reasoned that, under the Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335
(1976) three-part test, the private interests, public interests, and risk of error were fairly accommodated
by permitting the magistrate to conduct the hearing. [d. at 677-8 I.
120. See 285 U.S. at 64. The Crowell Court approved a federal district judge's de novo decision-
making which had included a new hearing.
121. 447 U.S. at 683.
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Only Justice Blackmun's concurrence responded to Justice Mar-
shall's argument in dissent that the Magistrates Act, as interpreted by
the Supreme Court, violated Article III. Justice Blackmun empha-
sized that, under the statute, the Article III judge remained in con-
trol-to choose to hear facts again, to recommit the matter to the
magistrate, or to accept the magistrate's decision. 122 As a conse-
quence, Justice Blackmun concluded that the only "conceivable dan-
ger of a 'threat' to the 'independence' of the magistrate comes from
within, rather than without, the judicial department."123 In contrast,
Justice Marshall characterized a judge, who approved a magistrate's
report without holding a new hearing, as making a "blind guess.,,124
Justice Marshall argued that the majority authorized an impermissible
delegation to non-Article III actors of the judicial power to make
factfinding decisions in criminal cases.
The drafters of the post-Northern Pipeline amendments to the
Bankruptcy Act worked under the umbrella of Raddatz when they
revised the Bankruptcy Act. The new amendments require bank-
ruptcy judges, when deciding "non-core" bankruptcy issues, to submit
"proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law" to federal judges.
The judges, in tum, "after considering the bankruptcy judge's pro-
posed findings and conclusions and after reviewing de novo those mat-
ters to which any party has timely and specifically objected,"125 are to
enter final judgments. Thus, the bankruptcy judge has become an ad-
junct to an Article III judge and the Raddatz test for Article III legiti-
macy-that the federal judge make the "ultimate" decision-appears
to be satisfied. 126
But is it? How carefully will "reports and recommendations" (of
magistrates) and "proposed findings" (of bankruptcy judges) be scruti-
nized? Given workload demands, the incentives to adopt magistrates'
and bankruptcy judges' suggestions will be enormous. After all, what
122. Id. at 685.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 703.
125. 28 U.S.C.A. § 157(c)(l) (West Supp. 1985). "Core" bankruptcy matters are defined as mat-
ters concerning the administration of estates, allowance or disallowance of claims against estates, deci-
sions about creditor preferences, discharging debts, the sale of property, and the liquidation of assets.
28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2) (West Supp. 1985). "Non-core" bankruptcy matters are not specifically enumer-
ated by the 1984 amendments. The amendments do indicate that "non-core" matters include the liqui-
dation of personal injury, tort, or wrongful death claims. Id.
126. For cases upholding the 1984 amendments against Article III challenges, see In re Produc-
tion Steel, Inc., 48 B.R. 841 (M.D. Tenn. 1985) (in "core" matters, bankruptcy judges function as
legislative courts, in "non-core" matters, bankruptcy judges are adjuncts like magistrates); In re Tom
Carter Enterprises, 44 B.R. 60S, 608 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (bankruptcy courts constitutional as adjuncts to
district courts, which retain primary jurisdiction); In re Benny, 44 B.R. 581, 589 (N.D. Cal. 1984)
("Everything under the 1984 Act is within the constitutional power and right of Congress. . . .").
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is the point of the delegation and of the creation of these auxiliary
institutions if not to siphon off work? Assuming that parties would
not request de novo review of all decisions of magistrates or bank-
ruptcy judges, parties will object some of the time. !27 If federal judges
have to redecide all cases in which objections are made, then the work-
load savings will evaporate. As a consequence, it is fair to assume!28
that the fact pattern in Raddatz will be repeated: that judges will adopt
decisions without rehearing witnesses and that, in some instances,
judges will adopt adjuncts' decisions with only the most cursory re-
view. 129 In some cases, the name on the opinion will be that of the
Article III judge but the real author will be a non-Article III actor.
The Magistrates Act takes the adjunct notion one step further.
The statute provides that, upon parties' "consent," magistrates may
decide cases and enter final judgment, with review provided by appel-
late courts-as if the decisions had been authored in the first instance
by federal district court judges.!30 While the Supreme Court has not
issued an opinion approving section 636(c), nine courts of appeals
have ruled on this section.!3! In all these cases, appellate courts up-
127. Apparently, neither the Administrative Office of the United States Courts nor the Federal
Judicial Center collect nationwide data on the rate of objections taken from magistrates' reports and
recommendations. Telephone interview with C. Seron (June 1985). For a survey of the rates of objec-
tions filed in nine federal districts, see C. SERON, THE ROLE OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES,
Tables 22, 23 (Federal Judicial Center, 1985) (in 878 dispositive motions studied, 220 challenges were
made (25%). New hearings were held in only 18 of the 220 cases; in nondispositive decisions by magis-
trates, of 956 motions decided, only 4% were challenged).
128. See. e.g., Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1050 (7th Cir. 1984)
(Posner, J., dissenting: "some judges may sometimes rubber-stamp the recommendations of their ad-
juncts"); C. SERON, supra note 127, at 99-100 (in the 220 cases in which challenges were made, judges
sustained magistrates 79% of the time).
129. See C. SERON, supra note 127, at 100 (79% acceptance rate in cases studied). The Raddatz
opinion itself creates incentives to affirm magistrates' findings. The Court held expressly that, when
accepting a magistrate's report, a district judge need not rehear witnesses. The Court reserved the
question of whether, when refusing to accept a magistrate's ruling, a district judge had to hear witnesses
again. 447 U.S. at 681 n.7. Justice Blackmun's concurrence underscored the unsettled nature of this
question, 447 U.S. at 684-85, and some lower courts have concluded that Raddatz is limited to the
affirmation situation. See, e.g., Wotford v. Wainwright, 748 F.2d 1505, 1507 (11th Cir. 1984); Louis v.
Blackburn, 630 F.2d 1105, 1109 (5th Cir. 1980).
130. 28 U.S.c. § 636(c) (1982). Appeal may be taken to a district court judge. 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(c)(4) (1982). Appeal thereafter to the circuit court is limited, see Ward v. Warren County, 759
F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(5) to authorize appeals, after magis-
trate and district court have ruled, only when "substantial and important questions of law" are at
issue). For statistical year 1982, magistrates received 2448 cases upon consent of the parties; most were
disposed of without trial. C. SERON, THE ROLES OF MAGISTRATES IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 5
(Federal Judicial Center 1983).
The 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act also provide for the consensual referral to bank-
ruptcy judges of proceedings "related to a case under title II ...... 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West Supp.
1985). Appeals may also be taken to the district court, 28 U.S.C.A. § 158(a) (West Supp. 1985), and
access to the courts of appeals thereafter is similarly limited.
13\. Wharton-Thomas v. United States, 721 F.2d 922 (3rd Cir. 1983); Pacemaker Diagnostic
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held the statute against challenges that the grant of such authority to
magistrates was a jurisdictional defect not waivable by the parties.
The appellate courts found lawful the congressional decision to permit
parties voluntarily to submit their disputes to non-Article III actors.
The courts rejected claims that crowded district court dockets gener-
ated sufficient pressures so that the consents given were not truly "vol-
untary.,,132 In addition, the majorities were unpersuaded by the
concern that using magistrates diminished the pressure on Congress to
create needed Article III judgeships. 133
All of these cases go beyond the rationale upon which Justice
Blackmun grounded his defense of the magistrate system approved in
Raddatz. Justice Blackmun had stressed that the statutory delegation
to magistrates in section 636(b) of the Act was constitutional because
Article III judges remained in contro1. 134 An Article III judge could
Clinic of Am., Inc. v. Instromedex, Inc., 725 F.2d 537 (9th Cir. 1983) (en bane), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct.
100 (1984); Collins V. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, IDS S. Ct. 218 (1984); Wil-
liams V. Mussomelli, 722 F.2d 1130 (3rd Cir. 1983); Puryear V. Ede's Ltd., 731 F.2d. 1153 (5th Cir.
1984); Goldstein V. Kelleher, 728 F.2~ 32 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, IDS S. Ct. 172 (1984); Lehman
Bros. Kuhn Loeb, Inc., v. Clark Oil & Ref. Corp., 739 F.2d 1313 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S.
Ct. 906 (1985); Geras V. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1984); Fields V.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Auth. 743 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
See generally Note, Federal Magistrates and the Principles ofArticle III, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1947
(1984) (adjudication by magistrates under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) does not violate Article III because that
article is to protect judiciary from intrusion by other branches). Cf. Posner, J., dissenting in Geras v.
Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d at 1045-54 (separation of powers is not merely tripartite;
Article III to protect judicial independence from all, including other judges); Note, Is the Federal Mag.
istrote Act Constitutional After Northern Pipeline, 1985 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 189.
132. E.g., Pacemaker Diagnostic Clinic of Am. V. Instromedex, Inc., 725 F.2d 537, 543 (9th Cir.
1984) (en bane), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 100 (1984). In addition, courts have refused to permit consent,
once given, to be withdrawn-absent "extraordinary circumstances." Fellman v. Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 735 F.2d 55 (2d Cir. 1984); Swallow Tum Music V. Tidal Basin, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 504, SID (D.
Me. 1984) (both interpreting 28 U.S.c. § 636(c)(6) (1982».
There is some evidence of pressure imposed by district courts to consent to magistrate adjudica-
tion. See C. SERON, THE ROLE OF MAGISTRATES: NINE CASE STUDIES 61 (Federal Judicial Center
1985) (interviews with lawyers in one district indicated that all agreed that, once a judge raised the
potential for consent to magistrate adjudication, "lawyers feel that they have little choice but to go
along with the suggestion"). See also Ford V. Estelle, 740 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1984) (invalidation of
assignment of prisoner case without prisoner's consent to magistrate for trial).
133. E.g., Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at 549 (Schroeder, J., dissenting); Geras v. Lafayette Display
Fixtures, Inc., 742 F. 2d 1037, 1051-54 (7th Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting). The Seron study, supro
note 127, at 59, suggests that the use of magistrates also diminishes pressure to fill vacant judgeships.
134. 447 U.S. at 685. Justice Blackmun overstated the case in one respect. Under 28 U.S.C.
§ 636(b), once delegation to magistrates is made and litigants do not object to the magistrates' reports,
then the report is often entered as the judgment of the court; close judicial supervision is somewhat
dependent upon litigant objection. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) (1982). Justice Blackmun is correct in that
district courts do retain the authority to review magistrates' decisions even without party objection
(United States v. Flaherty, 668 F.2d 566, 585 (lst Cir. 1981); Webb V. Califano, 468 F. Supp. 825, 828·
29 (E.D. Cal. 1979), but that review may be more limited than that which would have occurred had
objections been filed. Anderson V. South Carolina, 542 F. Supp. 725, 727 (D.S.C. 1982), affd on other
grounds, 709 F.2d 887 (4th Cir. 1983). The reach of appellate review may also be limited by the failure
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give work to or withhold work from a magistrate and could review as
much or as little of a magistrate's decisionmaking as desired. In con-
trast, under the section 636(c) consensual provisions of the Magis-
trates Act, the litigants have all the control and the magistrates are the
functional equivalents of federal district court judges whose work is
reviewed under deferential standards of review by appellate courts-
and only if a party appeals. 135 Further, since the vast majority of all
cases are settled, not tried, and since many judges assign pretrial man-
agement to magistrates, there are many activities of magistrates that
are never documented, much less reviewed.
The case law emerging from the two versions of the adjunct
model-that in which the adjunct does not formally issue the final
opinion and that in which the parties authorize the adjunct to issue a
final judgment-support the constitutionality of my hypothetical
"Commerce Court," as modified to include adjunct provisions. More-
over, these cases suggest broad support for the employment of unpro-
tected judicial officers, of individuals who can be fired by their
superiors (federal judges) as well as "abolished" by Congress. The
world of Article III adjuncts seems firmly established. 136
Once again, we are left with some wonderment at what causes the
fuss about Article III. If all these Article III judges137 who issue the
to object to a magistrate's ruling. See United States v. Schronce, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 2395 (1984). Cf Britt V. Simi Valley Unified School Dist., 708 F.2d 452, 454 (9th
Cir. 1983) (failure to object to magistrate's report does not waive appeal on "purely legal issues").
Further, in cases in which parties object to magistrates' recommendations, the acceptance rate is never-
theless high. See supra note 129.
135. Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), review by appellate courts is bounded by the same rules as are
applied to the district court. See Geras v. Lafayette Display Fixtures, Inc., 742 F.2d 1037, 1048-49 (7th
Cir. 1984) (Posner, J., dissenting: "appellate control over the conduct of jury trials ... is especially
limited"); Swallow Turn Music v. Tidal Basin, Inc., 581 F. Supp. 504, 508-10 (D. Me. 1984). For
example, district court findings of fact are set aside only if "clearly erroneous." Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a).
Appellate courts review magistrates' findings rendered pursuant to consensual jurisdiction under the
same "clearly erroneous" standard. Collins V. Foreman, 729 F.2d 108, 117 (2d Cir. 1984), cerro denied,
105 S. Ct. 218 (1984).
136. In addition, Congress has provided and courts have upheld consensual reference to magis-
trates for misdemeanor trials (see 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1982), approved in United States V. Byers, 730 F.2d
568 (9th Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 333 (1985). Courts have also approved magistrates' author-
ity to conduct the voir dire, United States V. Bezold, 760 F.2d 999 (9th Cir. 1985); United States V.
Peacock, 761 F.2d 1313 (9th Cir. 1985), and jury trials even without litigants' consent. Lugenbeel v.
Schutte, 600 F. Supp. 698 (D. Md. 1985). CJ. infra note 140.
137. One might have speculated that, in light of the differing positions of the justices of the
Supreme Court and the lower federal judiciary, judges in courts at the varying levels would hold sys-
tematically different views of the necessity for strict application of Article III. For example, since
Supreme Court justices are so obviously powerful, they might feel less of a need for Article III protec-
tions than do members of the lower bench. Consequently, Supreme Court justices might have been
expected to enforce the provision with less vigor. On the other hand, the visibility of the Court and the
controversial decisions made would suggest that the justices would be unflinchingly committed to Arti-
cle III. Lower court judges might also have incentives to relax the protections of Article III; workload
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opinions approving the Magistrates Act are prepared to endorse the
existence of a variety of parajudicial non-Article III officers, and if
these non-Article III judges are permitted to do so much of Article III
judges' work, what harm would flow from turning most (all?) adjudi-
cation over to them? The ease with which the federal courts have ap-
proved adjuncts suggests possible future developments which may take
the concept farther. Congress might proceed to enlarge the domain of
non-Article III actors either by expanding the "adjunct" model or by
relying more heavily upon parties' consent.
First, perhaps Congress might attempt to satisfy the "adjunct"
criterion by assigning, without parties' consent, all trial-like adjudica-
tory functions to non-Article III actors and by providing appeal as of
right in all cases to Article III judges. In Raddatz, the Supreme Court
abandoned the "de novo" interpretation of Crowell v. Benson and said
that, at least in some cases, new hearings were not required. 138 Fur-
ther, in the cases upholding consensual submission to magistrates, the
parties' agreement coupled with the possibility of appeal suffice for Ar-
ticle III purposes. 139 Congress could build on these case law distinc-
tions between factfinding and lawmaking. The next step would be to
give all trial court functions to non-Article III actors and to permit
ordinary appellate procedures to provide the veneer of Article III.
Justice Brennan's "essential attributes of judicial power" might be
stretched but still met-by conceptualizing all non-Article III deci-
sions as not "really" final and enforceable until after appellate rights
have been exhausted or waived. The non-Article III actors could be
confined to discrete subject matters-bankruptcy judges working on
that part of the docket, magistrates having (as they already do in many
districts) primary responsibility for prisoner litigation140 and the like.
demands on the trial bench are eased to some extent by delegation of cases to non-Article III actors.
Perhaps the mixed motives wash out any predictions based upon place in the hierarchy about how
judges will rule on Article III questions.
The one group that is a bit more puzzling is the appellate judges; it is more difficult to explain why
the appellate courts have been willing to relax Article III strictures, as has occurred with appellate
court approval of the magistrates' consensual jurisdiction. Appellate court judges have no direct work-
load gains (and in fact may have increased burdens as the number of first tier decisionmakers is in-
creased) from Article III relaxation and would seem to need the protections alforded by the clause.
Supportive of this thesis, some of the most eloquent defenses of Article III come from members of the
courts of appeals. See. e.g.• Kaufman, supra note 20; Schroeder, dissenting in Pacemaker, 725 F.2d at
547-55; Feinberg, supra note 20, at 273-76; Posner, dissenting in Gems, 742 F.2d 1037, 1045-54 (1984).
138. 447 U.S. at 676. As noted, supra note 129, new hearings are not required in cases in which
judges accept magistrates' reports based upon witnesses' credibility.
139. E.g., Goldstein v. Kelleher, 728 F.2d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 172
(1984).
140. 28 U.S.C. § 636(bXI)(B) (1982) expressly provides for magistrates to hold evidentiary hear-
ings in prisoners' habeas and conditions cases; that section's constitutionality was upheld in Hinman v.
McCarthy, 676 F.2d 343 (9th Cir. 1982), cen. denied, 459 U.S. 1048 (1982). LocaI rules have delegated
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Alternatively, if willing to abandon the "generalist" requirement, the
entire docket could be turned over, in the first instance, to non-Article
III judges.
Second, Congress could exploit the concept of parties' consent;
Congress could constitute the bankruptcy court, the magistrates, and
even my hypothetical "Commerce Court" simply as alternatives to
Article'III courts. The validity of all of these entities could rest en-
tirely upon the parties' consent to jurisdiction. Thus, Congress could
create an entire "alternative" court structure for which litigants could
"volunteer." 141 Of course, reliance upon such consensual provisions
could eventually undermine the impetus for Congress to create new
judgeships.142 If Congress can respond to the request for federal adju-
dicatory decisionmaking by the provision of non-Article III actors,
then the Article III courts will lose many of their decisionmaking
opportunites.
Would the Court permit such developments? And even if found
"constitutional," should we be troubled by the growth of a non-Article
III judiciary? Once again we come to the question of whether to care
about the attributes of life tenure and no diminution of salary, placed
in Article III as insulation for the judiciary. My guess is that at least
some of the developments suggested above would be disapproved by
the Supreme Court, which would once again assert a special domain
for Article III judges. Yet, in light of how much of Article III the
Court has already "given away," is there anything coherent which it
might say in opposition to these possible developments?
What, after all, is the point of Article III-given the many
Supreme Court and lower court decisions that have approved the crea-
matters specifically to magistrates; see General Orders, U.S. Dist. Ct., S.D. Tex. 82-4 (magistrates to
conduct jury trials in prisoner civil rights cases), invalidated in Ford v. Estelle, 740 F.2d 374 (5th Cir.
1984). In 1984, magistrates were involved in the dispositions of 18,157 prisoner petitions (more than
58% of the 31,107 petitions filed) in federal districts. 1984 ADMINISTRATIVE OffICE REPORT, supra
note 2, at 142, 205.
141. The Tax Court is a model here. See 26 U.S.c. § 7441 (1982) (tax court as Article I court).
The Tax Court has concurrent jurisdiction with federal district courts. 26 U.S.c. §§ 7422, 7442 (1982).
Further, litigants are encouraged to "volunteer" for the Tax Court, in which one need not first pay the
disputed amount before seeking adjudication. Flora v. United States, 357 U.S. 63, 72 (1958) (payment
of full tax allegedly due is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in district court). There appears to be
relatively little litigation of the Tax Court's constitutionality; the cases uphold the legality of the court.
See. e.g., Simanonok V. C.I.R., 731 F.2d 743 (11th Cir. 1984); Sparrow v. C.I.R., 748 F.2d 914, 915 (4th
Cir. 1984); Knighten v. c.I.R., 705 F.2d 777, 778 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 897 (1983).
142. Cf Judicial Conference Subcommittee Chairman Explains Process for Setting Judgeships, 17
THIRD BRANCH 1,4-6 (Jan. 1985) (interview with Chief Judge Charles A. Moye, Jr., a member of the
Judicial Conference Subcommittee on Judicial Statistics of the Judicial Conference, noting that the
committee was beginning to factor in the number of magistrates as relevant to the number of judgeships
requested from Congress; describing the desirability of "more effective, or greater, use of other [non-
Article III) personnel within the judicial structure) (hereinafter Moye interview).
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tion of non-Article III courts and decisionmaking within Article III
courts by non-Article III actors? Even if the Supreme Court would
decline to validate congressional creation of an alternative court,
should we care? Haven't the many alternatives already in place viti-
ated the powers of Article III judges and shown us all that Article III
attributes are not essential to federal judicial decisionmaking? that, in
fact, we can live with a judiciary populated by individuals who can be
fired?
V. THE MYTH
I do not think that either the federal courts' decisions or contem-
porary understandings have taken us quite this far. The Court, reflect-
ing what I believe are deeply-held feelings, has insisted that there be
actors, with life tenure and salary protection, who can make decisions
over a broad range of cases and who can render final decisions and
enforce their orders by contempt. What motivates the Court's insis-
tence on "holding that line," its rejection of the broad grant of juris-
diction to bankruptcy judges under the 1978 amendments, and its
insistence that, under the Magistrates Act, fin~l judgment rests with
the district judge? .
I think that, the murkiness of its decisions aside, the Court's opin-
ions reflect some strongly held convictions about Article III. I titled
this discussion "The Mythic Meaning of Article III Courts" because I
think the Court's interpretation of Article III is premised upon a deep-
seated myth about the role of judges. 143 The myth is captured in this
societyl44 by the story of Lord Coke v. King James I, in which (in
some versions) Lord Coke stands up to the King and defies the power
of the executive to dictate the outcome of cases. 14S King James orders
the Judge to find on behalf of the claimant favored by the King. (Or,
as the Judge reported it, "then the King said, that he thought the law
was founded upon reason, and that he and others had reason, as well
143. Robert Cover calls narratives such as this one the "texts of jurisdiction." Cover, The Folk·
tales ofJustice: Tales ofJurisdiction, 14 CAP. V.L. REV. 179 (1985) (forthcoming).
144. Other societies have had remarkably similar narratives; see, e.g., the Talmudic story of the
confrontation between Judge Simeon v. Shetah (head of the Sanhedrin) and the King, as discussed in
Cover, supra note 143 at 184. There is some irony that, despite cross-cultural pictorial representations
of the judge as a female goddess, see Resnik, Appendix, The Iconography ofJustice, ManageniJl Judges,
96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 446 (1982), the preeminent "texts" of justice have only male characters. To-
day, the judge who comes closest to acting out the text is Rose Bird, Chief Judge of the California
Supreme Court, soon to face a retention election, and facing public hostility for ruling in unpopular
ways. See Love and Clifford, Bird Hurt by Her Image as a Foe ofDeath Penalty, Los Angeles Times,
June 16, 1985, at I, col. 1.
145. Prohibitions Del Roy, 77 Eng. Rep. 1342, 12 Co. Rep. 63. See also J. CAMPBELL, I THE
LIVES OF THE CHIEF JUSTICES OF ENGLAND 270-73 (1849). Cf C. DRINKER BoWEN, THE LION AND
THE THRONE 302-06 (1956).
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as the Judges."146) The Judge, facing death or the Tower of London,
said to the King:
that true it was, that God had endowed his Majesty with excellent
science, and great endowments of nature; but His Majesty was not
learned in the laws of his realm of England, and causes which con-
cern the life, or inheritance, or goods, or fortunes of his subjects,
are not to be decided by natural reason and judgment of law,
which law is an act which requires long study and experience,
before that a man can attain to the cognizance of it: and that the
law was the golden met-wand and measure to try the causes of the
subjects; and which protected his Majesty in safety and peace:
with which the King was greatly offended and said, that then he
should be under the law, which was treason to affirm, as he said; to
which I said, that Bracton saith, quod Rex non debet esse sub
homine, sed sub Deo et lege. 147
That the King is beneath no man, but is beneath God and the law.
I think this image-of Judge v. King-animates the Court's work
in Article III. The "essential attributes of judicial power" to which
Chief Justice Hughes and Justice Brennan both referred but neither
precisely defined are found in this paragraph from Lord Coke. Here
are the quintessentially judicial "private rights" cases. Here are the
broad jurisdiction grants- over "life, or inheritance, or goods, or for-
tunes." And here is the need for the powers of finality and con-
tempt-to equip judges to do battle with the executive (and in this
country, with the legislature). By insisting on the powers of finality,
generality, and contempt, the Court provides Article III judges with
the capacity to review executive and congressional action in a diverse
set of arenas and to enforce decisions at odds with the "King." Article
III judges stand ready, as "gladiators" of sorts, should the need
arise-as it has recently in the Social Security nonacquiescence
cases. 148
Of course, our Article III judges may identify with Lord Coke
146. Prohibitions Del Roy, supra note 145, at 1343.
147. Id.
148. See Lopez v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1464 (9th Cir. 1985) (disapproving Social Security Adminis-
tration policy not to alter agency's method of discontinuing social security benefits in light of court
rulings; injunction ordering agency to alter its procedures). See also Lewis, Respect for Law?, New
York Times, June 18, 1984, I at 19, col. 1 (Reagan administration's policy of nonacquiescence in disa-
bility cases shows "contempt for the rule of law"). Cf Bator, Disability: No "Lawless" Government
Stance, New York Times, June 28, 1984, I at 26, col. 3 (nonacquiescence is an "exceptional practice"
which promotes the "sound development of legal doctrine. . . .").
See also Galtieri v. Wainwright, 582 F.2d 348, 375 (5th Cir. 1978) (Thornberry and Godbold
dissenting) ("we are heirs to the most precious legacy of Lord Coke, the power to discharge from
custody even one imprisoned by order of the king").
Strauss, supra note 5, argued that the separation of powers model is obsolete. 84 CoLUM. L. REv.
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but they enjoy luxuries which he did not. Our judges have protection
from being fired (symbolically killed) because of the constitutional
text. Given that our "gladiators" have such thick shields, bravery is
not so necessary; the battle is far safer than that which Lord Coke
faced. In that sense, Article III judges may be required less often to
display moral courage. 149 But moral courage may be a quality upon
which we would rather not have to depend. The myth of Lord Coke is
made complex by other versions of the story-that after Lord Coke
had stood up to the King, James ordered him taken to the tower. The
Judge then fell upon his knees and begged for forgiveness. James was
at first loath to renege, but Lord Coke's aunt's husband intervened and
pleaded on the Judge's behalf, and the King permitted the Judge to
live. ISO Our Article III judges are not as vulnerable as was Lord Coke;
their mythic battles are made safe by Article III.
Further, the judges still have a large arena over which they have
some control. There is some risk of overstating the degree to which
the Supreme Court has given away its Article III powers. The appar-
ently gaping hole made by the Murray's Lessee "public rights" and by
the Crowell categories may be smaller than first assumed. We live in a
world of post-Goldberg v. Kelly entitlements. lSI In a sustained series
of cases, the Supreme Court has read congressional and state statutes
as vesting rights in individuals against the govemment. IS2 Although
agency decisionmakers do a substantial amount of work at the first
tier, many agency decisions are not immune from the scrutiny of Arti-
cle III judges. 1S3 Moreover, the Supreme Court has, under the due
574-81.603-34. Even if reconceptualization to incorporate a "fourth" branch is appropriate, the judici-
ary's role remains as a countervailing presence to the others.
149. Or their displays of moral courage are less identifiable. Consider the tests of judges subject
to discharge. See supra note I, and H. STERN, JUDGMENT IN BERLIN 94-101, 358-7S (1984) (Article
III judge, acting in non-Article III capacity, must decide whether to disagree with his employer, the
United States State Department, and permit criminal defendants, tried in the United States Court for
Berlin, to have a jury trial).
ISO. As C.D. Bowen quotes the account of Sir Rafe Boswell to Dr. Milbome:
[Tlhe Lord Coke humbly prayed the king to have respect for the Common Lawes of his
land . . . . After which his Majesty fell into that high indignation as the like was never
knowne in him, . . . offering to strike. . . . Which the Lo. Coke perceaving fell fiatt on
all fower; humbly beseeching his Majestie to take compassion on him and to pardon him if
he thought zeale had gone beyond his dutie and allegiance. His Majestie. . . continued his
indignation. Whereuppon the Lo. Treasurer the Lo. Cooke's unclue by marriage, kneeled
down before his Majestie and prayed him to be favourable. To whom his Majestie replied
saying, What has thou to doe to intreate for him? He aswered, In regard he hath married
my neerest kinswoman."
C. DRINKER BoWEN, supra note 145, at 305.
151. 397 U.S. 254 (1969).
152. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
153. There is a presumption of review. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); see
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process clause, required federal and state agencies to cloak their deci-
sionmaking with procedural safeguards, to act more like courts and
thereby blur the line in both directions. ls4 In addition, there are other
routes for challenging agency decisionmaking. It was for the Supreme
Court to review and approve the standard of proof in Securities and
Exchange Commission proceedings; ISS it was for the Supreme Court
to explain the legitimacy of the Occupational and Safety Hazards
Act's determination not to provide jury trials to those facing adminis-
trative fee sanctions. IS6 In 1984, the courts of appeals heard some
3000 appeals from agency rulings. IS7 In sum, most of the public rights
arena is far from immune from Article III oversight. ls8 Article III
courts retain a degree of control and perhaps, in terms of the volume
of cases, all the control that they want. IS9
generally Currie and Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Opti-
mum Forum, 7S COLUM. L. REv. I (1975) (discussing division of review by district and appellate
courts and suggesting a separate Article III appellate court to review certain kinds of agency decisions).
The one major exception, as noted, is the Veterans Administration; see discussion supra note 71.
154. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) (Social Security Administration process-
ing of the termination of disability benefits). See generally Rubin, Due Process and the Administrative
State, 72 CALII'. L:REv. 1044 (1984) (Supreme Court should have adapted due process protections to
administrative context); for a criticism of the Court's approach, see J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC Jus-
TICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS (1983) (agency decisionmaking in need of
improvement but mimicking court procedures is not efficacious route); Mashaw, Conflict and Compro-
mise Among Models ofAdministrative Justice, 1981 DUKE L.J. 181 (current approach to administrative
due process in need of revision).
Iss. Steadman v. Securities and Exch. Comm'n 450 U.S. 442 (1977).
156. Atlas Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review, 430 U.S. 442 (1977).
157. 1984 ADMINISTRATIVE OffICE REPORT, supra note 2, at 110.
158. This is not to say that the Court has required that all agency decisions are reviewable. See,
e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 105 S. Ct. 1649 (1985) (Federal Drug Administration's decision not to take
enforcement action not subject to review under the Administrative Procedure Act); Southern'Ry. Co. v.
Seaboard Allied Mining Corp., 442 U.S. 444 (1979) (Interstate Commerce Commission'S decision not
to exercise its authority to hold a hearing not reviewable). Cf Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Manage-
ment, 105 S. Ct. 1620 (1985) (interpreting Merit System Protection Board statute as precluding review
only of agency's factual determinations and reiterating presumption in favor ofjudicial review); Stark v.
Wickard, 321 U.S. 288, 310 (1944) ("under Article III, Congress established courts to adjudicate ...
claims of infringement of individual rights whether by unlawful action of private persons or by the
exertion of unauthorized administrative power"). How far Congress could constitutionally go in pre-
cluding judicial review of all agency decisions remains an open question. K.C. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW, § 28.09,494-99 (Supp. 1982);~bin, supra note 71.
159. Some argue that, if all federal adjudication needs had to be met by life-tenured judges, their
ranks would have to be increased to a number that would intrinsically diminish the prestige of the
federal bench. H. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 28-30 (1973). See also Moye Interview, supra
note 142, at 5 ("for some time it has been the feeling. . . that problems will be encountered if the ranks
of Article III district judges continue to increase at the present rate"); and King, The Unmaking of a
Bankruptcy Court: Aftermath of Northern Pipeline v. Marathon, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 99 (1983)
(Article III judges lobbied in opposition to proposals to give Article III status to bankruptcy judges).
Under this view, Article III judges retain their "gladiator" powers in part by the small size of their
ranks; thus, Supreme Court decisions such as Raddatz could be read as wisely conserving Article III
authority.
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I believe that the potential battle-Lord Coke v. King James-
animated the discussions of both Justices Brennan and White in
Northern Pipeline. Justice White claimed that bankruptcy cases were
not those in which a battle would occur. l60 Justice Brennan must
either have thought the opposite or been unsure. Hence, the "hold
that line" stance, because we can never know when issues which ap-
pear apolitical will become charged with concern. If Justice Brennan
did in fact make the implicit prediction that bankruptcy cases were
potential battlegrounds, he has been proven correct. Bankruptcy
courts today are where major social policy issues---eompensation for
victims of asbestosis, toxic waste cleanups, and labor relations-are
being played out. 161
However, even with the recapture to some extent l62 of the bank-
ruptcy court, even with the narrowing of the "public rights"-plus ex-
ceptions, Article III courts may already have countenanced too great
an incursion into Article III preserves. The question is whether the
"gladiators" will know when the battle starts. Under the pressures of
crowded dockets, the courts have permitted a substantial amount of
delegation of decisionmaking to non-Article III judges. Administra-
tive law judges and magistrates now rule on a great number of mat-
ters. 163 In some districts, magistrates are perceived to be "additional
judges."I64 In many districts, prisoners' cases have been turned over
to magistrates; 165 empirical studies suggest that magistrates find fault
with prior decisions of trial judges at somewhat lower rates than did
160. 458 u.s. at 103 (White, J., dissenting).
161. In re Johns Manville, 36 Bankr. 727 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1984) (asbestos manufacturer may file
bankruptcy petition, thus turning plaintiffs alleging asbestos injury into potential creditors in bank-
ruptcy proceedings); NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 104 S. Ct. 1188 (1984) (bankruptcy court may
approve rejection of collective bargaining contracts; once a debtor-in-possession files for bankruptcy,
debtor may unilaterally modify the agreement without violating the NLRA); Ohio v. Kovacs, 105 S.
Ct. 705 (1985) (state injunction requiring a firm to clean a chemical waste dumping site is a debt
dischargeable in bankruptcy). The 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act responded to some extent
to the Bi/disco case. See II U.S.CA. § 113 (West Supp. 1985) and White, The Bildisco Case and the
Congressional Response, 30 WAYNE L. REV. 1169 (1984).
162. Under the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, bankruptcy judges are under the super-
vision of district court judges when hearing "non-core" proceedings without parties' consent. See supra
note 125. In addition, district court judges may withdraw any case or proceeding from a magistrate,
either on their own motion or on that of a party, "for good cause shown." The district court is
required to withdraw jurisdiction on a party's motion if resolution of a case involves "consideration of
both Title II and other laws. . . regulation organizations or activities affecting interstate commerce."
Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 104,98 Stat. 341 (1984), 28 U.S.C.A. § 157 (West Supp. 1985).
163. See Lubbers, supra note 3, at 384.
164. C. SERON, supra note 127, at xii, 39.
165. The duties "most frequently assigned" to magistrates are prisoner civil rights and habeas
cases and social security cases. C. SERON, THE ROLE Of MAGISTRATES IN FEDERAL DISTRICT
CoURTS IX (Federal Judicial Center, 1983).
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Article III judges. 166 While many of these decisions are largely subject
to reconsideration by Article III judges, that review is dependent upon
the record shaped below. In a substantial percentage of the cases in
which delegation has occured, the United States is a party. In Rad-
datz, after all, the question was the credibility of the testimony of two
government officials as contrasted with that of a criminal defendant.
The only adjudicator who heard the witnesses was a magistrate-an
individual without life tenure and without salary guarantees. How
could an Article III judge reviewing such a record know if the case
presented a moment of unconscionable government overreaching
which should have been bravely challenged by a judicial officer con-
firmed in his or her powers by constitutional status?
In short, we are left with a view of Article III that there is some-
thing essential there, and that it matters that final decisions are made
by specially empowered actors. On the other hand, Article III judges
have conceded (perhaps out of workload pressures, perhaps from con-
viction) that it does not matter that the underlying bases of those deci-
sions are formed by actors who are not as independent-either from
Congress or (in the case of magistrates) from Article III judges them-
selves. The ranks of the first tier of the federal judiciary are now filled
with individuals who can be fired. These individuals will need the
bravery of a Lord Coke (as described in his own version of the events),
for they are not as protected as are the Article III judges who review
the decisions made. As exemplified by the story of Lord Coke, and
our own history, such moral courage is unusual.
I do not know if this compromise will work, but there are reasons
to be concerned. First tier decisionmakers have enormous powers to
shape records and to protect their own decisions. 167 Unless Article III
judges have and exercise the authority to undertake "de novo" consid-
eration with gusto, then the real decisionmakers are those without Ar-
ticle III attributes. 168 Appellate review of records made and facts
found by non-Article III judges is a weak substitute for Article III
166. Allen, Schachtman, and Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus and its Reform: An Empirical Anal-
ysis, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 675, 727 (1982) (magistrates recommended that relief be denied to more than
90% of the petitions filed; district court judges denied relief to 85.4% of all petitioners).
167. See generally Resnik, Tiers, 57 So. CAL. L. REV. 837 (1984) (discussing the insulation of first
tier decisionmakers and the expansion of doctrines that increase deference paid to first tier rulings).
168. Whether this is good or bad depends upon assessments of who populates the first tier. For
example, in the years before Crowell v. Benson was decided, the fledgling administrative adjudicatory
system was seen as a needed balance to a conservative, unfriendly federal judicial apparatus. Alberts-
worth, Judicial Review ofAdministrative Action by the Federal Supreme Court, 35 HARV. L. REV. 127,
153 (1921-22) ("with the increase in population and its concentration in large urban centers, involving
of necessity a desire for more speedy justice, administered by men more conversant with the de facto
social and economic communities, court review of administrative action must be limited more and more
. . . if much of our social legislation is to succeed").
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judging. If the Court is correct that Article III attributes are impor-
tant, that safety is essential to brave judgment, then the compromises
made do not provide the protections intended. 169 In order for Lord
Coke to come face to face with the King, in order for Lord Coke to
assert his independence from the King and to challenge the King, the
Judge had to rule in a manner that displeased.
169. In this regard, the approval of the consensual provisions of the Magistrates Act, discussed
supra notes 130-133 and accompanying text, is extremely troubling as are the consensual provisions of
the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments. Documentation of the difference in decisionmaking between non-
Article III judge and Article III judge is very difficult. As noted, the Administrative Office of the
United States Courts does not keep data on the number or kind of cases in which magistrates' or
bankruptcy judges' decisions are overturned by district court judges. See supra note 127.
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